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Clashing Visions of a "Living"
Constitution: Of Opportunists and
Obligationists
by William Van Alstyne*
I
I am honored to have been invited to give the Cato Institute's
ninth annual B. Kenneth Simon Lecture in Constitutional Thought
and to join the distinguished judges and scholars who have preceded
me in this series. Because this is an opportunity to step back and
reflect on more timeless constitutional questions, I've chosen as my
subject clashing visions of a "living" Constitution. And yet, however
timeless, the subject is especially timely now since we've been privy
recently to no fewer than four Senate confirmation proceedings in
as many years respecting who should be sitting on our Supreme
Court.' Those hearings have produced a broad range of views about
whether we have a "living" constitution and, in particular, about
the proper scope of judicial review of constitutional questions.
* Lee Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. This is an edited version of
remarks delivered as the ninth annual B. Kenneth Simon Lecture in Constitutional
Thought at the Cato Institute on September 16, 2010.
1See, for a fair sample, the following references for the four most recent confirmation
hearings of Supreme Court nominees: 1. The Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010); 2. The Nomination of Sonia Sotomayor to be an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009); 3. The Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006); 4. The Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be
Chief Justice of the United States, Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
(2005). Moreover, there are a number of observers who also regard it as entirely
appropriate for senators to vote "for" or "against" a Supreme Court nominee for
political or ideological reasons. See, e.g., David Greenberg, "Admit the Obvious: It's
a Political Process-Ideology Governs Judicial Confirmation. Let's Say So." Wash.
Post, July 18, 2004, at B3.

13

CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW

Upward of 20 "schools of thought" on the "right" role for justices
have emerged in recent decades, mostly from the legal academy,
although shortly I will reduce that number to two-opportunists
and obligationists. Before I do, however, I will treat very briefly just
two or three of the main strains of constitutional interpretation,
simply to give a flavor of the recent debate.
One such school goes by the ungainly but revealing name of
"noninterpretivism." This innovative neologism emerged a few
decades ago, originally in a well-noted essay by Stanford law professor Thomas Grey, and then again in some additional spirited writing
by Michael Perry at the Northwestern Law School, who developed
the theory in several lengthy articles.2 As the name suggests, noninterpretivism is best understood as opposed to, well, interpretivismthe idea that a judge should interpret and apply the text before him,
the text of this Constitution, not least because the oath he takes is
an oath to support this-not even "the"-but this Constitution. But
to do that, to interpret and apply the actual text, when you want
with all your heart to make it a "living" constitution, is to be ruled
by that dreaded "dead hand of the past." And so if the actual
Constitution is to come alive, the literal text has to be treated as an
altogether subordinate matter, which is precisely what the noninterpretivists prescribe.
Reduced to its essence, this is a strange doctrine, is it not? We do
not purport even to be "interpreting" the particular text we mean
to render in some noninterpretive fashion. To be sure, we are presuming to deliver ourselves a statement about the supreme law of the
land, pertaining to what governments and we may and may not do.
But at the same time, we are liberated from the despair of textual
uncertainty and, likewise, from the tyranny of endlessly contestable
history. We're free to invent our "living" constitution.
Fortunately, noninterpretivism, as such, did not long endure. And
I claim at least some modest share of credit for its decline insofar
as I wrote to Tom Grey and to Michael Perry and put into each of
those letters a mischievous footnote-a question asking merely
2

See, e.g., Thomas Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution? 27 Stan. L. Rev.
703 (1975); Thomas Grey, Symposium on Interpreting the Ninth Amendment: The
Uses of an Unwritten Constitution, 64 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 211 (1988); Michael Perry,
Noninterpretive Review in Human Rights Cases: A Functional Justification, 56 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 278 (1981).
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which part of the Constitution was it that they were "non-interpreting" that day, insofar as they did not purport to be interpreting
anything at all in the actual Constitution.
But no sooner had noninterpretivism declined than it was replaced
by a school calling itself "nonoriginal interpretivism." Old wine in
new bottles, it defined itself, like its predecessor, by what it was notoriginalismf the idea, as it eventually emerged, that the Constitution
should be interpreted according to the original public meaning of
its terms. It is called "nonoriginal interpretivism" because one is
purporting to use the particular clauses as they actually appear in
the document, at least as a forensic point of departure, if scarcely
little more. But one is then proudly not to be ruled by the unreliable,
possibly irresponsible, and almost always difficult-to-recover material of the original drafters or ratifiers in rendering the "interpretation" that appears to be the better or the "best." And so we're
"freed," once again, to reimagine our "living" Constitution.
Beyond those two closely related schools is a third that warrants
notice before we take up our main project. Less an interpretive
doctrine than a frank acknowledgment of modem constitutional
reality, it is a theory about how the Supreme Court has come to
"amend" the Constitution outside the amendment process prescribed in Article V. It was formulated by Bruce Ackerman, a distinguished and exceedingly well-published member of the Yale law
faculty.4 And it begins by admitting, candidly, that much of modem
"constitutional law" bears little correspondence to the Constitution
itself as originally understood. Those changes, moreover, have come
about without any formal change in the document-including any
subsequent amendments, pursuant to the express formal provisions
of Article V-to account for and document the decisions that produced the actual changes.
See Originalism: A Quarter-Century of Debate (Stephen G. Calabresi ed., 2007). For
what may be the most recent work deriding a different but not unrelated doctrine,
"formalism," and belittling "formalists" (i.e., those who foolishly think that the text,
and what was said of it by its contemporary drafters and ratifiers, are the proper
focus for adjudicating constitutional disputes), see Brian Tamanaha, Beyond the
Formalist-Realist Divide: The Role of Politics in Judging (2010).
4 See Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lecture: Discovering the Constitution, 93 Yale
L.J. 1013 (1984); Bruce Ackerman, 2006 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lecture: The Living
Constitution, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1737, 1794-98, 1809-12 (2007). Bruce Ackerman, We
the People: Transformations 403-08 (1998).
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But Ackerman's is not simply a descriptive account of constitutional history over the past century. No, he went on to declare
forcefully that the Court's decisions could rightly be seen as solid
"nontextual amendments"-"Ackennan amendments," one might
say. His idea was, essentially, that if, through sustained elections
like those that returned President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to office
three consecutive times, the country's attention is riveted to certain
crises of a constitutional sort, then by repeatedly returning to office
a president who has made a political point of wanting a change in
constitutional law through the judicial appointment process, if it meets
with sufficient political approval (as evidenced by presidential and
senatorial elections), the "changes" eventually effected by a Supreme
Court thus created serve as "real" amendments. As such, it would
be inappropriate for a later Court to revisit those changes, he added.
Moreover, that such "amendments" are neither in the text nor
brought about like real amendments is irrelevant because this is the
way-or at least one equally valid way-in which you keep the
Constitution "alive."' Indeed, one could say that it's the ultimate
"politicization" of the Constitution.
Rather than continue, however, with yet more misbegotten recent
efforts to keep our Constitution "alive," let me suggest that the field
of constitutionalists may be divided usefully into two main generic
groups: opportunists and obligationists. And opportunists, to be
clear, are not of a single ideological hue; some are on the left, others
on the right. Yet those two "opposing" camps share a common
bond: they both "find" things in the Constitution that they want to
find and ignore things that are inconvenient.
Opportunists "on the left" are hardly difficult to notice.' In fact,
proponents of the noninterpretivist and nonoriginal interpretivist
schools just discussed have been almost entirely self-identified with
the left, especially in their promotion in recent decades of the Court's
equal protection jurisprudence. But their opportunism goes much
further back, as the Ackerman thesis indicates, focused as it is on
I Even now

I can scarcely see this word in print without at once also "seeing" it in
the original, namely, with Boris Karloff starring in his most famous role, exclaiming
"It's alive!" as he jolted several thousand volts of electricity into the intimidating
carcass of a soon-to-be-animated corpse, "the Frankenstein monster." Perhaps the
reader might be spared this gruesome thought-then again, perhaps he ought not be!
6 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986).
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the New Deal constitutional revolution as a "constitutional moment"
amounting to a constitutional "amendment." Ackerman finds such
politically driven, judicially crafted "amendments" perfectly acceptable, notwithstanding that this one "found" vast new congressional
powers that restricted long-standing liberties-powers and restrictions that hadn't been found in the Constitution for some 150 years,
but now suddenly appeared plain as day to those who looked long
and hard enough.' Having "discovered" those powers (and ignored
those rights), the political forces behind them were able at last to
implement the New Deal programs the left had been promoting
since the dawn of the Progressive Era. In short, in finding the powers
and restrictions they wanted to find, opportunists of the left emptied
the Constitution of the limits the Framers had deliberately fashioned,
thus bringing the document, to their mind, "alive."
Opportunists "on the right" seem at first blush more difficult to
find, not least because they ordinarily count themselves interpretivists, originalists, and textualists. But a closer look reveals that many
of them, too, are guilty of seeing what they want to see and ignoring
what they want to ignore. Perhaps Judge Robert Bork, at a general
level, best illustrates the opportunism on the right. Speaking of our
"Madisonian dilemma," he wrote that our "first principle" as a
nation is that "in wide areas of life, majorities are entitled to rule, if
they wish, simply because they are majorities," whereas our "second
principle" is "that there are nonetheless some things majorities must
not do to minorities, some areas of life in which the individual must
be free of majority rule." That gets Madison exactly backwards.
Madison stood for the principle that in wide areas of hife individuals
are entitled to be free simply because they are born free. Nonetheless,
in some areas majorities are entitled to rule, not because they are
inherently entitled to, but because we authorized them to, under the
Constitution Madison himself drafted.0 Ironically, opportunists of
'See Rexford G. Tugwell, "A Center Report: Rewriting the Constitution," The Center
Magazine, March 1968, at 20: "To the extent that these new social virtues [i.e., New
Deal policies] developed, they were tortured interpretations of a document [i.e., the
Constitution] intended to prevent them."
8 See Richard A. Epstein, How Progressives Rewrote the Constitution (2006).
Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America 139 (1990) (emphasis added).
1o Recall Madison's promise in Federalist No. 45, that the powers of the federal
government would be "few and defined."
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the right generally reject Ackerman's claim that the New Deal constitutional revolution amounted to a "constitutional moment" that
"amended" the document; but they subscribe to the vast majoritarianism the revolution unleashed when it eviscerated the doctrine
of enumerated powers, a majoritarianism that not only is nowhere
to be found in the actual-in this-Constitution-indeed, was assiduously guarded against-but one that gives us, practically, a "living" Constitution, an empty vessel to be filled by constantly shifting,
"living" majorities.n
By contrast, obligationists, although not always in agreement
among themselves, are identified by a singular common accord: they
take their oath of office seriously, and that oath is to support and
defend this Constitution, not some other. In so doing, they commit
themselves neither to misread the document knowingly or carelessly
nor to overread or underread it by reading their own preferences
into it. In particular, in taking the Constitution as is, obligationists
are committed not to make it "living" by imposing upon it a theory
other than the theory on which the document itself rests. Rather,
for obligationists the Constitution, from its inception, has been very
much "alive" in its ordinary operations-and alive further, let me
add, in that it remains subject to change through the processes
reserved for determining change, namely, the amendment processes,
neither more nor less.
II
Remember our title: "Clashing Visions of a 'Living' Constitution."
I have given you alternative processes of growth and change: opportunists willing, even anxious, to implement constitutional change
through judicially crafted, nontextual "amendments;" obligationists
sworn to see constitutional change brought about through the constitutionally prescribed Article V amendment process. I am not inclined
to impugn the motives of the opportunists. What I think instead is
that they and their jurisprudence may simply proceed from a heartfelt effort to try to keep the Constitution from becoming disappointingly "out of date," even "ossified" and "petrified"; but that even
in the interviews of Supreme Court nominees before the Senate
n See Roger Pilon, Lawless Judging: Refocusing the Issue for Conservatives, 2 Geo.
J. L. & Pub. Pol'y. 5 (2001).
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Judiciary Committee there is an unexamined premise, namely, that
it is part of the task of Supreme Court justices thus to update the
Constitution and to do so by appropriatejudicial "art": that is, by
construction-by misreading, or "rereading," or, if you prefer, "differently" reading various clauses of authorization and restriction,
reading them such as they ought to be, whether or not they are.
But how do we know whether our Constitution is truly living?
One way is by looking to see whether there have been any amendments and, if so, when they were made, by whom, and, indeed, just
what their content may be-that is, what do they register, what do
they tell us about some change that may have taken place in this
society to such an extent as to have become embedded in some new
text, as part of this Constitution. Let me try to shed light on those
questions with a pair of comparisons, and then two actual examples
from our recent history that I hope will illuminate these issues.
In my original home state of California, one of our ancient giant
redwood trees will occasionally fall, and if we cut across its massive
face we see its cambium rings, tracing the tree's natural history back
to antiquity. When still alive, the tree's rings go on and on, recording
changes year by year. Once a tree falls and dies, however, it cannot
of course add any rings, so the tree begins nearly at once to petrify.
These trees and their rings are rather like the Dead Sea Scrolls, to
cite a different metaphor, which rely on learned rabbis to keep their
meaning "alive" and pertinent by some kind of sublime interpretive
art-at least until God returns to "explain" himself anew. So too a
petrified tree is dead. It cannot add anything new.
And that furnishes a segue to a second comparison, between our
"living" Constitution and Hans Christian Andersen's famous fable,
The Emperor's New Clothes. The Constitution, in this likeness, does
not on its face reflect any change-that is, any actual amendmentbut the judges and the people nonetheless say that change is there!
And so, by this congenial consensus of collaborative fabrication,
they manage to find what they wanted to find to be authorizedindeed, thus to be authorized-and, likewise, they manage to find
what they wanted to find prohibited is (behold!) prohibited!
But every once in a while, just as in the original endearing Andersen fable, a small child will look, ponder a bit, and then quite spontaneously declare: "Where? I don't see it! Actually, all I see is the
emperor in his barely adequate underwear! I don't see any of that
'splendid raiment' you have all ascribed to the emperor!"
19
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However charming, it is a very disarming, yet most telling comparison. And as I've reflected on these comparisons, it has occurred to
me that real "cambium rings" have become increasingly difficult to
add to this, our Constitution. They have, at least in part, as I hope
soon to show, because people now far more greatly mistrust the
addition of virtually any new language concerning anything but
nominal "technical" amendments.
Indeed, it is doubtful that anything like the 10 amendments that
eventually became our Bill of Rights could even be successfully
proposed today by the requisite supermajorities in Congress, much
less ratified by the requisite number of states. Far more than in
1789 (or even 1866), there is a greater collective suspicion of "new"
amendments because, I believe, it is feared today that enactment of
additional text may just give judges and others still greater license
to use that language as one more springboard for reshaping our
constitutional regime-which may then prove pleasing to new
majorities, yet conform little if at all to the original proposal as
presented, approved, submitted, and actually ratified by the states.
This phenomenon of a diminished Article V has in fact affected
my own thinking on these matters. It is a deadening phenomenon,
producing a kind of "negative synergy," clogging our Constitution.
"Synergy" is usually defined as the operation of forces cooperatively
producing new elements-that is, elements incapable of being produced by either original force in isolation. "Negative" synergy, in
turn, and in the context of our "living" Constitution, operates like
this: The more courts transform constitutional clauses without needing actual amendments to do so-that is, the more they do not
require new text-the less necessary new text seems to be. But then
exactly to the extent that courts do not require new text, neither
may it be safe to provide it, for to the extent such text is provided
to record a definite change, one may rightly be wary-merely reacting
in tutored fear of the administration of that new text, given what
the Court has previously presumed already to do.
From this "negative" synergy, then, both Congress and the public
grow less willing to make changes through the normal Article V
processes. But exactly in such measure as that becomes true, then
even the more conscientious judges in turn will inexorably feel
stressed to be forthcoming with "transformative" constructions of
extant clauses-and "wisely" to do so because they understandably
20
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despair of the amendment process. So it continues, an endless cycle
feeding on itself. And if Article V effectively dies, the Constitution
itself dies with it, becoming simply a vehicle for either judges or
majorities to implement their will, despite what the actual Constitution may say.
III
Two examples, not unrelated, may shed further light on the questions I raised above. Nearly 40 years ago, in 1972, large congressional
majorities proposed a twenty-seventh amendment-not the "technical" Twenty-Seventh Amendment we have today, dealing with congressional compensation, which was finally ratified in 1992 after
languishing in the states since 1789, but a far more substantive
"Equal Rights Amendment." Section 1 of the proposed ERA provided simply that "Equality of rights under the law shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account
of sex." Section 2 provided for congressional enforcement. That was
pretty much it.
Again, far more than the required two-thirds majority in both
houses embraced the ERA in 1972. And over the next two and a
half years the proposal was ratified by 34 of the 38 states required
for ratification. But then progress ground to a halt, largely because
of determined opposition from a variety of circles, led by a very
capable woman, Phyllis Schlafly, of the Eagle Forum. And even after
Congress extended the deadline for ratification by another seven
years, the proposal expired, falling three states short.
Now on the merits it is clear to me that after you have accounted
for everything else regarding the pros and cons of the ERA-the
possibility of unisex restrooms, women in combat, same-sex marriage, and the like-an irreducible number of no votes stemmed from
Schlafly's convincing observations that in similar circumstances in
the past, the Supreme Court had taken the language of an amendment or of a constitutional clause, along with the original understanding about the provision, and had just ignored that text and
understanding and gone merrily on its progressive way to fulfill its
own vision of what the Constitution "ought" to provide. Thus, we
now surely know that amendments are no longer trustworthy. "Vote
for this amendment, and the next thing you know there will be
21
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women in foxholes, unisex bathrooms, and gay and lesbian marriages!" And that was it-the proposed twenty-seventh amendment
simply lapsed.
To be sure, you may ask whether it matters. Are we actually worse
off on that account? Well I for one care a lot. The ERA would have
recorded a rite of passage for this country. In a mature country that
had come to think differently about gender equality and "gender
roles," it would have recorded on the face of our aging document
a real change. Exactly what we ought well to want, but frankly
altogether lack. What we have instead is but a quarrelsome series
of brokered Supreme Court cases,12 accomplishing most of what the
ERA would have enacted, to be sure, but you cannot find anything
in the Constitution that expressly attests to equal rights regardless
of sex or gender-real text. It's simply not there.
Indeed, and in fact, the sole provision that speaks to the general
issue most relevantly goes quite the other way. It is the provision
in Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment that declares that insofar
as a state denies the right to vote to "males" over the age of 21 and
not previously convicted of a crime, then that state's representation
in the House of Representatives shall be reduced proportionately.
But the clause itself is an express textual recognition that the perpetual disenfranchisement of women not only is not to be regarded as
inconsistent with the amendment's Equal Protection Clause, but
also does not even require some downward adjustment of a state's
allotment of representatives in the House. Indeed, it took the Nineteenth Amendment to change that constitutional fact.
That amendment, the Nineteenth, will further illustrate my larger
thesis. In his recent book, Active Liberty, Justice Stephen Breyer suggested in passing that women in America did not have the right to
vote until the Nineteenth Amendment was ratified in 1920.' The
See, e.g., Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001); United States v. Virginia,
518 U.S. 515 (1996); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Rostker v. Goldberg,
453 U.S. 57 (1981); Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981); Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See also Kathleen M. Sullivan
and Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 591 (2010) ("Justice Brennan never did get
his elusive fifth vote for his proposed strict scrutiny standard") and id. at 587 ("The
U.S. Constitution is the only major written constitution with a bill of rights that lacks
a provision explicitly declaring the equality of the sexes.").
13Stephen Breyer,, Active Liberty 32 (2005) ("Nor did women receive the right to
vote until 1920.").
12
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suggestion annoyed me even when I saw it there. It was not just
careless; it was flat out incorrect. Indeed, if you thought about it, it
could not plausibly be true. If women were denied the right to vote
prior to 1920, then how could the Nineteenth Amendment have
become ratified that very year? After all, since it takes two-thirds
of both houses and three-fourths of all the states to do the job, and
no state allowed women to vote as of that date, how many states
would you expect to go on with this proposal within a single year?
In truth, of course, by the time the Nineteenth Amendment came
up for a vote, a majority of the states had already fully enfranchised
women. What is most interesting, however, is how this expansion
of the right to vote can be seen as a significant cultural, political,
and real prologue to the "cambium ring" that is our Nineteenth
Amendment. These cultural changes were first reflected in the
"lesser" cambium rings of state legislation and state constitutions.
They report an evolution actively reflecting the cultural changes
within each relevant polity. In time those changes are recorded in
the Nineteenth Amendment and (behold!) there it is. Now we no
longer need worry about whether the next Supreme Court justice
would overrule the decision that enfranchised women. Their rights
are right there, in the text, for all to see. It is otherwise with the
ERA, of course, even though "the law" is today about the same as
it would be if that amendment had been adopted.14 But I do not
think we are nearly as well off for having done it that way.

IV
Yet even with a "living" constitution, one that sees change made
according to its own terms rather than through judicial or majoritarian machinations inconsistent with those terms, there will be issues
that make it difficult to separate opportunists from obligationists.
Suppose, for example, that a question were before the Supreme Court

" To be sure, by a combination of legislative grace (both state and federal) (e.g., Titles
VI (42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.) and VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.) of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964), plus some mild displays of judicial hubris in the case law, we have
experienced a "translation" of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments-albeit in
a way that would have dumbfounded the women's suffrage movement itself-and
so, by those means, have arrived closely to where we would be had the ERA passed.
(See, e.g., cases and references supra, note 12).
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concerning whether Congress could mandate that federal juries be
composed of fewer than their traditional 12 members.
Well it turns out that the constitutional text on that question and
the understanding surrounding the text are less than clear or helpful.
Article III says simply that "The Trial of all Crimes ... shall be by
Jury." The Sixth Amendment says more, but nothing on point: "In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury. . . ." Nor was the question
seriously debated in the Constitutional Convention or in the state
ratifying conventions. It was debated in the Virginia convention,
briefly, with people like George Mason and Patrick Henry generally
and deeply skeptical about the proposed new constitution. But James
Madison countered their skepticism on the jury question by saying
that the term "jury," as provided in Article III, "is a technical term"
that draws in its wake all its appurtenances so well and long established even as they are reflected in that book that "every member
has," namely, Blackstone's Commentaries on the Common Law.'" The
12-person jury, Madison continued, had been in existence for something like two centuries. No one contradicted Madison's statements
explicating the relevant provision of Article III.
If opportunists are able to ignore clearer evidence in order to reach
their desired ends, they are not likely to refrain from doing the same
when the evidence is thinner, as in a case like this or like so many
others that come before the Supreme Court. But even obligationists
may be inclined to "impose their own vision" in such cases, thus
appearing indistinguishable from opportunists. Here the evidence,
thin as it is, fairly clearly favors the 12-person jury. But suppose it
were still thinner. What might one look for? For starters, what was
the then contemporary practice? Was it nearly universal to have 12person juries (at least in federal, if not in state courts, as it was), or
were they somewhat exceptional? How far back did the "tradition"
of the 12-person jury go? Is there something said in the Blackstone
Commentaries that may tend to inform us? Those are just a few of
the questions that would concern an obligationist.

s Speech by James Madison at Virginia's Convention on the Adoption of the Constitution (June 20, 1788), in 3 Elliot's Debates in the Several State Conventions on the
Adoption of the Federal Constitution, at 541 (1836).
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In general, however, before a judge decides that the issue before
him really is an open question-that is, that there really is nothing
to tilt the balance-he should pause before "defaulting" and yielding
the "difference" to Congress because, frankly, there is little evidence
that Congress ever did this kind of research, or that its products are
principally driven by this kind of genuine constitutional preoccupation. After all, Congress is mainly concerned with social policy (and
of course with reelection), while the foremost concern of our courts
is, or at least should be, constitutional integrity. It appears, moreover,
that there is a correlation between the Supreme Court's taking constitutional questions seriously and Congress's doing so as well. Likewise, when the Court tends to abdicate and defer, Congress hardly
even discusses constitutional points of law with any gravity. Witness
the Court's recent "rediscovery" of enumerated powers federalism,6
which has prompted many in Congress to again ask, for the first
time in ages, "Do we have the power to enact this bill?"" That is a
refreshing change.
Thus, whether members of Congress take their oaths seriously
may depend to a very considerable extent on whether justices on
the Court take their oaths seriously. And so, as a last word, as
between the two groups I have juxtaposed, I have no doubt in saying
that it is the obligationists who care about the living Constitutionthis Constitution-the document that, if it is to remain alive, should
be interpreted and applied as is and changed, when needed, not by
judicial circumlocution or ungrounded majoritarian assertion but
by the processes provided for in the document itself.'" My concern
16Roger Pilon, "Congress Rediscovers the Constitution," Wall. St. J., Jan. 4, 2011,
at A17.
17 That, of course, is precisely the question before the five different federal
district
courts that have issued conflicting rulings on large parts of the recently enacted
"Patient Protection and Affordable Health Care Act" (informally known as the "ObamaCare" Act), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by the Health Care
and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029. Two
have struck down certain sections (district courts in Virginia and Florida); three have
ruled the other way (Michigan, Ohio, Virginia). These cases are currently on appeal
and the Supreme Court will almost certainly decide this question, whether it comes
in the 2011 term or a year hence, likely by a closely divided vote.
s I am, in this regard, at once reminded of Carl Shurz's sharp, well taken riposte to
Stephen Decatur's overly celebrated patriotic toast. While Decatur famously
exclaimed, "My country, right or wrong," Shurz observed, "My country, may it
always be in the right, and, when in the wrong, may it be put to the right." (emphasis
added). So, too, with this, our Constitution, that is, insofar as it may be defective, let
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is that we may have gotten so accustomed to the "exogenous" Constitution that the amendment process has itself begun to recede as
down a rabbit hole, as in Alice in Wonderland, and the country,
frankly, is significantly less well off on that account.
I am most grateful for this opportunity to share these thoughts
and I do, genuinely, thank you for your time and thought in considering them for whatever worth they may hold in musing about this
aging Constitution of ours, the oldest and still among the best in all
the world.

us-by amendment-remove those defects but let us not just "paper them over" (in
the manner of Hans Christian Andersen's clever tailors of Copenhagen, weaving
invisible judicial patches to cover naked places obvious to any unspoiled child).
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